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ABSTRACT
This iBrief will present a hypothetical network that allows
dissidents to transfer information outside the watchful eye of an
oppressive government. It will argue that because a network
operator meets the requirements of the safe harbor of section
512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the hosts of the
network are immune from any vicarious copyright liability.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Suppose you believe in supporting nascent democracies. While
trawling the web, you come across a software client, promoted as a way
to help dissidents in oppressed regimes. All you have to do is download
the client and let your computer help the movement. Would you
participate?
¶2
Consider a network designed to support democracy activists. To
conceal the activists’ identities and plans, software developers design the
network to prevent any user from knowing where data has come from,
where it is going, and what the data represents. Indeed, the network
would allow activists of all stripes to trade documents outside the
snooping power of oppressive governments. Individual users—like
you—are only asked to provide some hard drive space and an Internet
connection. The network transfers data through several different users,
providing more secrecy and reliability. You, however, will not know
from whom the data comes, or the content stored on your computer.
¶3
This secrecy may encourage illegal file sharers to use your
computer indirectly to transfer illegal files. Are you liable for their
illegal activities? Should you be liable? This iBrief will argue that,
because of the way this network has been constructed, the language of
section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) allows
people like you to use a safe harbor from copyright infringement.
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The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 updated the
2
Copyright Act to reflect a digital world. Congress hoped to provide
“greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for
3
infringement that may occur in the course of their activities.” This
iBrief will explore the applicability of safe harbors codified in 17 U.S.C.
§ 512 to a hypothetical network. By designing a network to allow free
transfer of data, such a network would also provide a way for users to
distribute data that may infringe copyright. As this note will argue,
entities storing potentially infringing material may moor in the safe
harbor of section 512(c) of the DMCA.
¶4

¶5
First, the note will discuss the components of section 512.
Second, it will describe a hypothetical network. Third, it will apply
section 512(c) to the hypothetical network. Finally, the note will
consider the legality of the network in light of other bodies of law.

I. THE SECTION 512 SAFE HARBORS
¶6
The DMCA provides a safe harbor from liability for copyright
infringement for four types of services that an entity may provide its
4
5
users: transitory digital network communications, system caching,
6
information residing on systems or networks at the direction of users,
7
and information location tools.

Section 512(a) applies to large Internet Service Providers
(ISPs). Congress intended that this section provide a safe harbor to
9
companies like Verizon and AT&T.
The statute allows service
providers that transmit, route, or provide connections to disclaim liability
10
As a part of a connection
from secondary copyright infringement.
between users, potentially infringing material may be copied as data is
11
transferred. For this safe harbor to apply, any copies made must be of a
¶7

8

2

Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
3
S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 20 (1998) [hereinafter Senate Report].
4
17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (2007).
5
§ 512(b).
6
§ 512(c).
7
§ 512(d).
8
See § 512(a).
9
Senate Report, supra note 3, at 41 (“Section (a) applies to communications
functions associated with sending digital communications of others across
digital networks, such as the Internet and other online networks.”).
10
§ 512(a).
11
Senate Report, supra note 3, at 41 (“Section (a) applies to service providers
transmitting, routing, or providing connections for material, and some forms of

12

transient nature. Without section 512(a), the Internet would not likely
exist as it does today.
Section 512(b) protects companies that cache data while
13
providing connections to customers.
Caching speeds up access to
14
content accessed by more than one user. It requires copying the data
15
returned by a user’s request for data from a remote server.
While
caching, the service provider may infringe copyright because the service
provider reproduces copyrighted material. This copy, however, simply
allows the local server to provide data to a subsequent user without
transferring duplicate data over the Internet. Section 512(b) codifies the
legality of this practice, which increases the efficiency of the Internet.
¶8

The third provision, section 512(c), protects companies from
16
Specifically, the
liability arising from material posted by a user.
DMCA provides a safe harbor from most monetary and injunctive relief
when a service provider would otherwise be liable for an “infringement
of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material
that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the
17
18
19
Auction and shopping websites have safely
service provider.”
moored in this safe harbor. An operator of the hypothetical network
developed in this iBrief will attempt to use the safe harbor provided for
“storage at the direction of a user.”
¶9

¶10
Finally, section 512(d) protects companies that index, refer to,
20
and link to websites that infringe copyright. Search engines commonly
index content without verifying the legality of linked content. When

intermediate and transient storage of material in the course of performing these
functions.”).
12
Id.
13
§ 512(b).
14
Senate Report, supra note 3, at 41 (“In terminology describing current
technology, this storage is a form of "caching," which is used on some networks
to increase network performance and to reduce network congestion generally, as
well as to reduce congestion and delays to popular sites.”).
15
See id. at 42 (“The material in question is stored on the service provider's
system or network for some period of time to facilitate access by users
subsequent to the one who previously sought access to it.”).
16
Id. at 43 (“Examples of such storage [applicable in section (c)] include
providing server space for a user's web site, for a chatroom, or other forum in
which material may be posted at the direction of users.”).
17
§ 512(c).
18
See, e.g., Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
19
See, e.g., Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090 (W.D.
Wash. 2004).
20
§ 512(d).

enacting the DMCA, Congress recognized the importance of indexing
21
the Internet through search engines.
This iBrief will focus on the applicability of section 512(c) to a
hypothetical network. Section 512(c) allows a service provider to
disclaim liability from copyright infringement arising from information
22
stored on its systems at the direction of a user.
Before discussing
section 512(c) and its related provisions in detail, the iBrief will present
the hypothetical network.
¶11

II. THE HYPOTHETICAL NETWORK
¶12
This iBrief will first discuss the components of the network and
then discuss the connection between components. There are several
components to the hypothetical network. This iBrief will assume an
initial user, three intermediate users, and a final user exist. The initial
user (U0) transfers a file to intermediate users, who store the files and
consequently transfer the file to the final user (UF). Each user that
connects to an intermediate user for the first time must agree to policies
mandated by the intermediate user.
¶13
The network extends normal peer-to-peer file sharing
technology. Additionally, the hypothetical network uses two programs
to maintain the secrecy of the identity and content of the files. The first
program encrypts the file so it is not easily comprehensible without
decryption using an encryption key. The second program, using an
encoding key, the size of the original file, and the original filename,
splits the encrypted file into pieces and generates filenames for each
piece. UF uses these programs in reverse order to recreate the original
file. UF and U0 pass the two keys (encryption and encoding) offnetwork. Put another way, UF and U0 transfer the keys over another
network, such as by telephone. Therefore, only U0 and UF can combine
and decrypt the file pieces to recreate the original file. Modern
cryptography techniques can be applied to a real network based on this
hypothetical network. For example, a public/private key system could be
used in this network.
¶14
In the hypothetical network, before U0 uploads a file to the
service providers, U0 runs the two programs. Once U0 has encrypted
and split the original file, U0 broadcasts a request for storage to the

21

Senate Report, supra note 3, at 49 (“This provision is intended to promote the
development of information location tools generally, and Internet directories
such as Yahoo!'s in particular, by establishing a safe-harbor from copyright
infringement liability for information location tool providers if they comply with
the notice and takedown procedures and other requirements of section (d).”).
22
§ 512(c).

intermediate users. Any intermediate user that will accept storage
responds affirmatively. U0 transfers each file piece to a different
intermediate user. When UF wants to find a file, UF enters the original
file size, encoding key and original filename into the second application
to generate the names of the files that constitute the original file. UF
then searches for the file pieces on the network following standard peerto-peer network techniques. Once UF downloads all of the file pieces,
UF can recreate the original file with the encryption key and first
program.
¶15
The hypothetical network explained above intentionally abstracts
the network for clarity. Moreover, although it may seem complex, this
hypothetical network could be implemented rather easily with software.23
This iBrief will not discuss the liability of U0 and UF or the software
developer. First, if U0 and UF infringe copyright, the safe harbors of
section 512 are inapposite to their liability. Moreover, illegal file sharers
are not the intended users of the network. Second, potential liability for
software developers involves unresolved legal questions beyond the
purview of this iBrief. The iBrief will argue that the intermediate users
that host files may disclaim liability for copyright infringement under
section 512(c) of the DMCA.

III. DISSECTING SECTION 512(C) OF THE DMCA
¶16
An entity must pass through several locks before mooring in the
safe harbor provided by section 512. Section 512(c) provides that:

A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except
as provided in section (j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction
of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled
or operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider—
(A)
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness,
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;

23

acts

An existing network that would likely fit within this hypothetical network is
Freenet. See The Freenet Project, http://freenetproject.org (last visited Oct. 31,
2009).

(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the
right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in
paragraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access
to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject
24
of infringing activity.
¶17
To apply this statute to the hypothetical network, this iBrief will
first discuss the threshold requirements for entities wishing to utilize the
safe harbors of section 512. It will then discuss the statutory
requirements of section 512(c). For each requirement, this iBrief will
discuss the current state of the law and then apply the law to the network
as described.

A. The Definition of a Service Provider
Section 512(k)(1)(B) defines service provider as: “a provider of
25
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”
Some plaintiffs have argued that entities must provide data connections,
26
like an internet service provider, to qualify for service provider status.
Courts, however, have construed the definition of service provider
27
Although courts have
broadly, including websites in the definition.
interpreted the definition of service provider broadly to include many
types of services, courts have not determined if an entity must meet a
minimum size requirement to qualify as a service provider.
¶18

¶19
Courts have allowed many entities to claim service provider
status. In Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., the Western District of
Washington held that Amazon was a service provider when it provided
28
website space to third party sellers.
Corbis alleged that several of
29
Amazon’s third party sellers infringed copyrights held by Corbis. The
24

§ 512(c).
§ 512(k)(1)(B).
26
See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 n.6 (W.D.
Wash. 2004) (“Corbis argues that Amazon is not a service provider because
Amazon does not serve to route or connect online digital communications.’ This
argument is unavailing. The relevant definition of service provider does not
require Amazon to engage in such activity.” (citations omitted)).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 1100 (“Amazon operates web sites, provides retail and third party
selling services to Internet users, and maintains computers to govern access to
its web sites. These activities fall squarely within the broad scope of the §
512(k)(1)(B) definition of ‘service provider’.” (footnotes omitted)).
29
Id. at 1097 (“Corbis has identified a total of 232 images . . . in which it claims
a copyright interest. Two of the images appeared on the IMDb website. The
25

court wrote that Amazon’s selling and serving customers falls “squarely
within the broad scope of the § 512(k)(1)(B) definition of ‘service
30
provider’ . . . .” Extending to providers beyond the World Wide Web,
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation held that: “[a]lthough the Act was not
passed with Napster-type services in mind, the definition of Internet
service provider is broad, . . . and, . . . Aimster [a Napster type service]
31
fits it.” Although the In re Aimster court rejected Aimster’s attempt to
pursue the safe harbor of section 512, the court concluded that
distribution networks were considered service providers under section
32
512(k)(1)(B). Since the courts have interpreted this provision broadly,
an internet storage provider should fall within the definition of service
provider of section 512(c).
¶20
Although the case law allows many services to qualify as service
providers, the case law does not clearly state what size entities must be to
33
qualify as service providers. Large companies like Amazon and
34
eBay have easily passed the bar as service providers. In ALS Scan, Inc.
35
v. RemarQ Communities, Inc., a unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit
36
held that even smaller entities were service providers. Remarq was, in
Internet terms, a small provider. At the time of litigation, it provided
37
access to 24,000 subscribers, and “remove[d] [user-posted materials]
38
after about 8–10 days to accommodate its limited server capacity.”
Both parties conceded that size did not disqualify Remarq from service
39
provider status. Size has not been litigated as a matter of practicality:
since section 512(c) requires that service providers lack knowledge of

remaining 230 images have been copied, displayed, and sold by vendor
defendants through their zShops sites.”).
30
Id. at 1100.
31
334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
32
Id. (“Aimster fits [the definition of a section 512 service provider].”).
33
Corbis, 351 F.Supp. 2d at 1100 (“Amazon operates web sites, provides retail
and third party selling services to Internet users, and maintains computers to
govern access to its web sites. These activities fall squarely within the broad
scope of the § 512(k)(1)(B) definition of ‘service provider’.” (footnotes
omitted)).
34
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(“There is no dispute over whether eBay is an Internet ‘service provider’ within
the meaning of Section 512.”).
35
239 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2001).
36
Id. at 623 (“Neither party to this case suggests that RemarQ is not an Internet
service provider for purposes of the Act.”).
37
Id. at 620 (“[RemarQ] has approximately 24,000 subscribers.”).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 623.

40

infringement, most small service providers would be denied the safe
harbor because they would be aware of the legality or illegality of
activity occurring on their networks. This iBrief asserts that a single user
qualifies as a service provider as defined by section 512(k)(1)(B). This
assertion is based on the broad language in section 512. In further
defining service provider, the section states that a service provider is an
entity that provides “online communications, between or among points
41
specified by a user, of material of the user’s choosing.” The legislative
history neither promotes nor prohibits this characterization; the Senate
42
Report simply states that the category is intentionally broad.
In the hypothetical network, the intermediate users can properly
claim service provider status under the definition of a service provider in
section 512(k)(1)(B).
The intermediate users provide “online
communications, between or among points specified by a user, of
43
material of the user’s choosing . . . .” The intermediate users provide
online communications between U0 and UF. U0 chooses the material.
Therefore, the intermediate users pass the first hurdle in claiming
protection from liability for the information that they store. For the
remainder of the iBrief, the intermediate users will be called service
providers.
¶21

B. A Termination Policy
¶22
Section 512(i)(1)(A) requires that a service provider “has
adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and
account holders of the service provider's system or network of, a policy
that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or
44
network who are repeat infringers.”
The Senate Report stated that
Congress wanted users who “abuse their access to the Internet through
disrespect for the intellectual property rights of others [to] know that
45
A user termination
there is a realistic threat of losing that access.”
policy fits this requirement. There are two independent requirements:
adoption of a policy and its reasonable implementation.

40

See infra Part III.E.
17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(A) (2007).
42
Senate Report, supra note 3, at 54–55 (1998) (stating that the service provider
definition for section (b)–(d) is broader than that for section (a), but not giving a
better explanation of the definition).
43
§ 512(k)(1)(A).
44
§ 512(i)(1)(A).
45
Senate Report, supra note 3, at 52.
41

First, section 512(i)(1)(A) requires that service providers inform
users of the consequences of using a network for copyright
46
infringement.
The language of the statute, however, allows the
47
provider latitude in designing the policy. In Corbis, Amazon required
that sellers agree to a user termination policy before selling on
48
Although Amazon’s policy did not “precisely track the
Amazon.
language of the DMCA,” the court held that the policy was properly
49
constructed. The Western District of Washington noted that the policy
prohibited the “listing, linking, or posting of any material that violates
copyright laws,” and warned infringers that Amazon may penalize users
by “restricting access to Amazon’s sites and suspen[ding] or terminat[ing
50
users’] service.” A policy that states the crime and potential liability
should pass muster under the DMCA. Furthermore, the statute does not
51
require that service providers demonstrate user policy enforcement.
Therefore, even if the provider has not actually terminated users, the
provider should be protected by the safe harbor if it has a policy
52
consistent with the requirements of section 512.
¶23

¶24
Reasonable implementation of a user policy “permits service
providers to implement a variety of procedures, but an implementation is
reasonable if, under ‘appropriate circumstances,’ the service provider
53
terminates users who repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright.” The
54
service provider legally cannot actively promote infringement; a policy
46

Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Section
512(i)(1)(A) requires service providers to . . . inform its subscribers of the
policy.”).
47
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (“This open-ended language contrasts markedly with the specific
requirements for infringement notices and take-down procedures set forth in §
512(c).”).
48
Id. (“Each vendor must agree to the terms of the Participation Agreement
before selling on the [Amazon website].”).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Todd E. Reese, Comment, Wading through the Muddy Waters: The Courts’
Misapplication of Section 512(c) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 34
SW. U. L. REV. 287, 298 (2004) (“Nowhere does the statute say that the policy
must have been applied to a specific individual. Thus, an [online service
provider] must simply make a good faith effort at consistently applying its
policy.”).
52
See id. (noting that a policy does not necessarily need to be enforced to
qualify under the safe harbor).
53
Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007).
54
See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003)
(determining that active promotion of infringement does not allow a company to

to prohibit infringement must be combined with actual termination of
55
In CCBill, the Ninth Circuit held that “a service provider
users.
‘implements’ a policy if it has a working notification system, a procedure
for dealing with DMCA-compliant notifications, and if it does not
actively prevent copyright owners from collecting information needed to
56
issue such notifications.” Moreover, the Ninth Circuit held that section
512(c) does not require that a service provider monitor the material or
57
activity on its network. In Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Corbis
noted “Amazon’s infringement policy has not been able to prevent
certain vendors from reappearing on the zShops platform under
58
Corbis then asserted “that Posternow’s reappearance
pseudonyms.”
59
shows that the infringement policy is a failure.” Disagreeing, the court
held that the DMCA does not require impeccable implementation of the
user policy: “The mere fact that [a user] appeared on [the service] under
a different user name and identity does not, by itself, create a legitimate
question of fact regarding the procedural implementation of Amazon’s
60
Similarly, in Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks,
termination policy.”
Inc., the Northern District of California suggested that a website
consisting of user-posted videos had reasonably implemented their user
61
policy. In Io Group, the plaintiff argued that Veoh’s policy was not
reasonably implemented because it was easy to obtain an email address,
and an email address was all that was required to subscribe to the
62
service. The court rejected this argument and held for the defendant.63
These holdings demonstrate that the safe harbor in section 512(c) is not
predicated on a proactive search for infringing material.

use the safe harbor, the court wrote that “[f]ar from doing anything to discourage
repeat infringers of the plaintiffs’ copyrights, Aimster invited them to do so . . .
.”).
55
See id. (“The common element of its safe harbors is that the service provider
must do what it can reasonably be asked to do to prevent the use of its service by
‘repeat infringers.’”).
56
488 F.3d at 1109.
57
See id. at 1111 (“To identify and terminate repeat infringers, a service
provider need not affirmatively police its users for evidence of repeat
infringement.”).
58
351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1103 (W.D. Wash. 2004).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 1104.
61
586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
62
Id. at 1143–44.
63
Id. at 1144 (holding that simply because the plaintiff was able to make two
suspiciously named email accounts and sign up independently under each does
not amount to lack of a repeat infringer policy).

A service provider must have a policy, inform its users of the
64
In the hypothetical
policy, and reasonably implement the policy.
network, each service provider has a policy and informs users of the
65
If constructed properly, the
policy during a user’s first connection.
agreement will satisfy the user policy requirement. Since a provider
must know that a user is infringing copyright to implement the user
policy, reasonable implementation will not be required until the service
provider obtains knowledge of infringement. Each service provider has
66
no idea whatsoever what data it is holding for the network. Moreover,
a service provider will never receive an infringement notice and therefore
67
Service providers comply with
never become aware of infringement.
section 512(i)(1)(A) as long as its user policy describes consequences for
copyright infringement, the service provider informs users of the policy,
and, in the unlikely event that the service provider receives repeat
notifications of infringement, the service provider terminates the user.
Since the hypothetical network satisfies all of these criteria, the service
providers should qualify for the section 512(c) safe harbor.
¶25

C. Accommodation of Standard Technical Measures
¶26
Section 512(i)(1) of the DMCA requires that providers
accommodate standard technical measures: “The limitations on liability
established by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the
service provider . . . accommodates and does not interfere with standard
68
Section 512(i) then defines “standard technical
technical measures.”
measures.”

[T]echnical measures that are used by copyright owners to identify
or protect copyrighted works and—
(A) have been developed pursuant to a broad consensus of
copyright owners and service providers in an open, fair, voluntary,
multi-industry standards process;
(B) are available to any person on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms; and

64

Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Section
512(i)(1)(A) requires service providers to: (1) adopt a policy that provides for
the termination of service access for repeat copyright infringers in appropriate
circumstances; (2) implement that policy in a reasonable manner; and (3) inform
its subscribers of the policy.”).
65
See supra Part II.
66
See supra Part II.
67
See infra Part III.H
68
17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1) (2007).

(C) do not impose substantial costs on service providers or
69
substantial burdens on their systems or networks.

Rarely do plaintiffs allege that service providers interfere with
70
standard technical measures. Even when presented with a question of
what constituted standard technical measures, the Ninth Circuit was
“unable to determine . . . whether accessing websites is a standard
71
The Central District of California has held that
technical measure.”
“[i]t thus appears to be an open question if any conduct or policy could
72
In Corbis, using a
interfere with ‘standard technical measures.’”
73
website was the way in which rights holders found infringing material.
If there is no cognizable standard technical measure, no court could hold
that a service provider violated this requirement for safe harbor.
¶27

¶28
In the hypothetical network, the system design may frustrate
attempts to access the material. The service providers do not frustrate
access—the programs used before placing files on the network frustrate
access. Since there does not seem to be a cognizable “standard technical
measure” and the service providers do nothing to interfere with a rights
holder’s ability to search for infringing content on the network, the
service providers in the hypothetical network comply with section 512(i).

D. Storage at the Direction of the User
¶29
The safe harbor in section 512(c) shields service providers from
liability arising from infringing material stored at the direction of the
74
user.
In some cases, courts and parties have simply assumed that

69

17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(2).
See, e.g., Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1143 (N.D. Cal.
2008) (“Nor does [Io] dispute that Veoh . . . accommodates, and does not
interfere with, ‘standard technical measures’ used to protect copyrighted
works.”); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1106 (W.D.
Wash. 2004) (“Corbis has not challenged Amazon’s assertion that it
accommodates and does not interfere with standard technical measures used to
identify and protect copyrighted works.”).
71
Perfect 10 Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1115 (9th Cir. 2007).
72
Perfect 10 Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1174 n.18
(C.D. Cal. 2002).
73
See 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1097 (“Corbis has identified a total of 232 images . . .
in which it claims a copyright interest. Two of the images appeared on the
IMDb website. The remaining 230 images have been copied, displayed, and
sold by vendor defendants through their zShops sites.” (emphasis added)).
74
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2007).
70

75

storage was at the direction of the user.
In ALS Scan, ALS Scan
alleged that the defendant was liable for infringing material posted in
76
The court did not even discuss the possibility
newsgroups by users.
77
that the infringing materials were not at the direction of the user. In Io
Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., the court determined that even
material created by a process initiated by a user upload is still considered
78
at the direction of a user. Veoh converted an uploaded file during the
79
upload process.
The Northern District of California determined that
even when an automated process gives rise to new infringing material, a
80
service provider could still retain the safe harbor of section 512(c). In
addition to exempting service providers from liability arising out of
potentially infringing material, Congress also wanted to protect service
providers from acts that occurred automatically when a user transferred
81
82
In CoStar Group v. Loopnet, the
material to a service provider.
District of Maryland held that a real estate listing site stored data at the
83
direction of the user. Loopnet allowed users to upload photos of real
84
estate to a central server. The service employed humans to scan photos
85
for obvious acts of copyright infringement and other criteria. The court

75

See, e.g., ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir.
2001) (ruling on a request for safe harbor under DMCA Section 512(c), the
court never discussed whether the storage was at the direction of the user).
76
See id. at 620 (“Two of the newsgroups to which RemarQ provides its
subscribers access contain ALS Scan's name in the titles. These newsgroups‘alt.als’ and ‘alt.binaries.pictures.erotica.als’-contain hundreds of postings that
infringe ALS Scan's copyrights. These postings are placed in these newsgroups
by RemarQ's subscribers.”).
77
See id. at 623.
78
See 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“[T]his court finds that
Veoh does not lose safe harbor through the automated creation of these files.”).
79
See id. at 1147 (“[U]sing third-party software, its system creates the Flash
and still-image files from user-submitted content.”).
80
See id. at 1148 (“But Veoh does not itself actively participate or supervise the
uploading of files. Nor does it preview or select the files before the upload is
completed. Instead, video files are uploaded through an automated process
which is initiated entirely at the volition of Veoh's users.”).
81
H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, pt. 1, at 11 (1998) (“[L]iability is ruled out for
passive, automatic acts engaged in through a technological process initiated by
another.”) [hereinafter House Report].
82
164 F. Supp. 2d 688 (D. Md. 2001).
83
Id. at 702 (“[Pictures] are uploaded at the volition of the user.”).
84
Id. at 692 (“[A] user, usually a real estate broker, may post a listing of
commercial real estate available for lease [and can] include a photograph.”).
85
Id. (“[Photos are] reviewed by a LoopNet employee to determine that it is in
fact a photograph of commercial property and that there is no obvious indication

held that even though humans filtered data, users directed material to be
86
stored with the service provider. The court in CoStar further noted that
“[t]he ability to remove or block access to materials cannot mean that
those materials are not stored at the user's discretion or it would render
87
the DMCA internally illogical.” Networks that rely on technology to
filter or do not filter user-posted material certainly fit the standard of
section 512(c) for materials posted at the direction of the user. Due to
the broad language of section 512(c), a service provider that only
provides storage for user material certainly stores material at the
direction of the user.
¶30
A service provider will be able to call upon the section 512(c)
safe harbor if it provides storage to a user and stores material at the
direction of the user. Service providers in the hypothetical network
provide storage for U0 at U0’s discretion and do nothing except transfer
the files to UF. The service provider does not screen data transferred to
it, nor does it convert the data that U0 transfers to the service provider.
Since the service providers in the hypothetical network store data at the
direction of users, the service providers may benefit from the safe harbor
of section 512(c).

E. Knowledge
¶31
To use the safe harbor, section 512(c) also requires that service
providers lack knowledge of infringement. In the statute, there are three
knowledge provisions:

A service provider shall not be liable for … infringement of
copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of
material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated
by or for the service provider, if the service provider—
(A)
(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity
using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or
circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness,
88
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material.

acts

that the photograph was submitted in violation of LoopNet's terms and
conditions.”).
86
Id. at 702 (“Although humans are involved rather than mere technology, they
serve only as a gateway and are not involved in a selection process.”).
87
Id.
88
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) (2007).

The first and second provisions concern what the provider knows
prior to an infringement suit. Section (iii) relates to the notification
89
provided to a service provider by a rights holder.
Therefore, this
portion of the iBrief will discuss section (i), section (ii), and will discuss
section (iii) in light of the later discussion of notification.
¶32

1. Section (i)
¶33
Section (i) requires that, before invoking the safe harbor of
section 512(c), a service provider lacked actual knowledge of
90
infringement prior to the lawsuit. Courts have set a high bar for actual
knowledge and most providers simply have no idea when actual acts of
infringement occur. In Costar, the plaintiff did not allege the service
provider had actual knowledge even though humans scanned user-posted
91
data for the service provider. Even after notices of infringement were
delivered to the defendant, the court did not impute actual knowledge to
the defendant. In CoStar, defendant Loopnet’s use of humans to filter
material did not give rise to actual knowledge of infringement because
“CoStar does not attach a copyright notice to its photos and even
CoStar's own expert could not identify a CoStar photo simply by
92
reviewing it.” The court held that unless the infringement was blatant,
93
Loopnet would not obtain actual knowledge.
Since few service
providers have actual knowledge, few cases discuss section (i). Most
cases discuss the second section of the knowledge requirement in section
512(c).
2. Section (ii)
¶34
Section (ii) requires that, in order to use the safe harbor, in
addition to not having actual knowledge, service providers must not be
94
The
aware of “facts or circumstances” that indicate infringement.
DMCA distinguishes section (ii) from cases in the physical realm that
have imputed copyright infringement liability to auction houses under
95
theories of secondary liability. The House Report on the DMCA stated
that “[t]his standard differs from existing law, under which a defendant
89

See infra Part III.H.
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(i).
91
CoStar, 164 F. Supp.2d at 698 (“Given the nature of the infringements in this
case, it was impossible for LoopNet to have knowledge of the alleged
infringement before receiving notice from CoStar.”).
92
Id. at 702 (explaining that although cursory, the service provider did have a
human review uploaded content).
93
Id. at 698 (“LoopNet cannot be charged with any form of knowledge before
receiving claims of infringement from CoStar.”).
94
§ 512(c)(1)(A)(ii).
95
House Report, supra note 83, at 25 (1998).
90

may be liable for secondary infringement if it knows or should have
96
In Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
known that material was infringing.”
97
Auction, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held an auction house liable for
copyright infringement on a theory of secondary liability under legal
98
The court reasoned that
principles common prior to the DMCA.
Cherry Auction was a proper target for secondary liability because
Cherry Auction had the right to terminate users for any reason and those
99
users sold infringing goods. Similarly, eBay users transact business in
100
goods that may infringe copyright.
In Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc.,
however, the Central District of California held that postings on eBay do
not give eBay knowledge of “facts or circumstances” that indicated
101
In contrast to Cherry Auction, the court held “that prior
infringement.
to [the] lawsuit, [eBay] did not have actual or constructive knowledge
that particular listings were being used by particular sellers to sell pirated
102
Therefore, the court allowed eBay to use the safe harbor of
[videos].”
103
section 512(c).
104

Congress intended that section (ii) work like a “red flag” test.
105
“The ‘red flag’ test has both a subjective and an objective element.”
The subjective element asks what information the provider actually
106
The objective element then queries whether a reasonable person
had.
107
would have understood that information to point to infringement.
In
¶35

96

Id.
76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
98
Id. at 263 (“Cherry Action’s ability to police it vendors under Cherry
Auction’s . . . broad contract with its vendors — was sufficient to satisfy the
control requirement.”).
99
Id.
100
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(noting that sellers post advertisements).
101
Id. at 1088 (“Here, because the focus of the copyright claims against eBay
concern infringing activity — the sale and distribution of pirated copies of
“Manson”-using “materials” posted on eBay’s website, Section 512(c) would
provide eBay a safe harbor from liability if eBay meets the conditions set forth
therein.”).
102
Id. at 1093.
103
Id. at 1088.
104
Senate Report, supra note 3, at 44 (“Section (c)(1)(A)(ii) can best be
described as a ‘red flag’ test.”).
105
Id.
106
Id. ( “In determining whether the service provider was aware of a ‘red flag,’
the subjective awareness of the service provider of the facts or circumstances in
question must be determined.”).
107
Id. (“[I]n deciding whether those facts or circumstances constitute a "red
flag"-in other words, whether infringing activity would have been apparent to a
97

A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,108 the Ninth Circuit held that
109
Napster had knowledge of infringement occurring on its network.
Although Napster was decided under the broader secondary liability
standard, the decision may factor into requests for the DMCA safe
harbor. Napster’s network likely would have met this “red flag” test.
Looking through the lens of the “red flag” test, Napster had a list of the
files transferred on its network, including many copyrighted popular
110
Napster therefore had information that indicated
music songs.
infringement (the subjective test) and the court held that a reasonable
person probably would have understood that this information pointed to
infringement (the objective test). In contrast with the standard
articulated in Napster, however, the Senate Report on the DMCA stated
that a, “service provider would have no obligation to seek out copyright
111
Although a service provider must acknowledge the
infringement.”
“red flags” of infringement, the safe harbor of section 512(c) does not
require that a service provider affirmatively search its network for
potentially infringing material. Additionally, a service provider “would
not qualify for the safe harbor if it had turned a blind eye to ‘red flags’ of
112
In other words, the provider cannot be
obvious infringement.”
willfully blind of infringement.
3. Section (iii)
¶36
Section (iii) requires that once a service provider obtains
knowledge of the infringement, the provider “expeditiously” remove
113
infringing material.
This section imparts knowledge to a service
provider after notification of infringement is presented to a service
114
Therefore, only when a service provider receives a
provider.
notification does section (iii) apply to the right to safe harbor under
section 512(c). Part III. H. of this iBrief, below, discusses notification.
reasonable person operating under the same or similar circumstances-an
objective standard should be used.”).
108
239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
109
Id. at 1021 (“Regardless of the number of Napster's infringing versus
noninfringing uses, the evidentiary record here supported the district court’s
finding that plaintiffs would likely prevail in establishing that Napster knew or
had reason to know of its users' infringement of plaintiff’s copyrights.”).
110
Id. at 1012 (“Once uploaded to the Napster servers, the user’s MP3 file
names are stored in a server-side “library” under the user’s name and become
part of a ‘collective directory’ of files available for transfer during the time the
user is logged onto the Napster system.”).
111
Senate Report, supra note 3, at 48 (1998).
112
Id.
113
17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) (2009).
114
See infra Part III.H.

4. Application
¶37
The service providers of the hypothetical network lack either
actual knowledge or “facts or circumstances” that imply infringement.
Without significant effort and the entire file, it would be impossible for
the service providers to know the name of the file, let alone its contents.
115
Therefore, unlike in Napster,
the service provider cannot simply
search its indices to determine whether there is infringing content, even if
that doctrine were applied in DMCA cases. Service providers cannot
even search for files by original filename. Since the service providers do
not know what files are being transferred, no red flags are presented to
the service provider. In a sense, the service providers of the hypothetical
network may be turning a blind eye to what data users transfer because
they are unable to see what information is being stored. Service
providers, however, must lack knowledge of the contents of network
files, lest that information find its way into adverse hands. Therefore, the
service providers should be able to moor in the safe harbor of section
512(c).

F. Right and Ability to Control
¶38
Section 512(c) also discusses a service provider’s “right and
116
The right and ability to control
ability to control [infringing] activity.”
activity is a necessary part of a rights holder’s attempt to deny a service
provider access to the safe harbor if the service provider gains a direct
117
There is a tension between this
financial benefit from the activity.
provision and the lack of knowledge requirement outlined in section
118
For example, the Ninth Circuit held that Napster had
512(c)(1)(A).
the right and ability to control its users because “Napster has an express
reservation of rights policy, stating on its website that it expressly
119
This
reserves the ‘right to refuse service and terminate accounts.’”
interpretation of “right and ability to control,” however, was not
premised on section 512(c), but under the more expansive general
120
Considering this tension, the
secondary infringement standard.
115

See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“Napster, however, has the ability to locate infringing material listed on its
search indices. . . .”).
116
§ 512(c)(1)(B).
117
Id.; see also supra Part III.E.
118
See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1110 (W.D.
Wash. 2004) (discussing how other courts have held the ability to terminate
accounts is not tantamount to the right and ability to control).
119
A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1023 (agreeing with the lower court that since
Napster policed its service, it had the right and ability to control users).
120
Id. at 1024 (“Napster’s failure to police the system’s ‘premises’ . . . leads to
the imposition of vicarious liability.”).

Central District of California has held that it would be impossible to
satisfy both the termination procedure of section 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) and
121
lack a right and ability to terminate accounts.
The court went on to
note that “Congress could not have intended for courts to hold that a
service provider loses immunity under the safe harbor provision of the
DMCA because it engages in acts that are specifically required by the
122
A service provider with a termination policy that satisfies
DMCA.”
section 512(c)(1)(A)(iii) does not necessarily mean that the service
provider has the right and ability to control users.
¶39
This iBrief argues that, in the hypothetical network, the service
providers have a valid termination policy. Beyond that, however, the
service providers do nothing to control network access. Since the service
providers do no more than enforce the termination policy, the service
providers do not have the right and ability to control material on its
network. Therefore, the service providers should retain the safe harbor
of section 512(c).

G. Financial Benefit
If a service provider does not have the right and ability to control
infringing activity, the service provider can use the safe harbor of section
512(c) regardless if the service provider obtains a financial benefit from
123
If a service provider has the right and ability to
the infringement.
control activity or material on its network, however, the service provider
can only use the section 512(c) safe harbor if the service provider does
124
In
not “[derive] a direct financial benefit from the infringement.”
addition to obvious examples like subscription fees or paying for access
to infringing materials, direct financial benefit includes what consists of
125
The Senate Report describes a draw as
a “draw” to a service provider.
“any such fees where the value of the service lies in providing access to
¶40

121

Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(“[T]he ‘right and ability to control’ the infringing activity, as the concept is
used in the DMCA, cannot simply mean the ability of a service provider to
remove or block access to materials posted on its website or stored in its system.
To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of the DMCA and render the statute
internally inconsistent.”).
122
Id. at 1093–94.
123
See Corbis, 351 F.Supp. at 1110 (“Because Amazon does not have the right
and ability to control the infringing material, it is not necessary for this Court to
inquire as to whether Amazon receives a direct financial benefit from the
allegedly infringing conduct.”).
124
Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004).
125
Id. at 1079 (“Thus, the central question of the ‘direct financial benefit’
inquiry in this case is whether the infringing activity constitutes a draw for
subscribers, not just an added benefit.”).

126

infringing material.”
In Ellison v. Robertson, the Ninth Circuit held
that America Online’s (AOL) USENET service did not retain subscribers
127
The court held that there was no direct
or result in new subscribers.
financial benefit to the provider because the infringing activity did not
128
Therefore, to retain safe harbor status, the
add to AOL’s bottom line.
infringing material or activity cannot be the reason users choose a certain
service provider, if the service provider charges a subscription fee. The
Ninth Circuit has also held that, where the presence of material or
activity increases users and thereby increases advertising revenue, the
service provider derives a direct financial benefit from that material or
129
activity.
That holding, however, was in Napster, where the Ninth
Circuit ruled under the broader standards of general secondary
130
Without any revenue or expected revenue, a service provider
liability.
does not obtain any sort of financial benefit.
¶41
If service providers were required to host files in order to
download files, there would arguably be a benefit to the service
providers. The ability to download free copies of copyrighted materials
may satisfy the financial benefit standard because there would otherwise
be a cost to access that material. The hypothetical network disassociates
uploads from downloads and no benefits accrue to service providers. As
long as the service providers internalize the costs of running the network
and receive no outside income in connection with running the network,
the service providers would not obtain any financial benefit from
infringing activity or material. Since the service providers in the
hypothetical network derive neither explicit financial benefit nor a
privilege by storing material, the service providers derive no direct
126

Senate Report, supra note 3, at 45 (1998).
Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079 (“We note that there is no evidence that indicates
that AOL customers either subscribed because of the available infringing
material or canceled subscriptions because it was no longer available.”).
128
Id. (“The record lacks evidence that AOL attracted or retained subscriptions
because of the infringement or lost subscriptions because of AOL’s eventual
obstruction of the infringement. Accordingly, no jury could reasonably
conclude that AOL received a direct financial benefit from providing access to
the infringing material.”).
129
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001)
(“Financial benefit exists where the availability of infringing material ‘acts as a
‘draw’ for customers.’” (citing Fonovisa Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d
259, 263–64 (9th Cir. 1996))).
130
Id. at 1024 (“Napster, however, has the ability to locate infringing material
listed on its search indices, and the right to terminate users’ access to the system.
. . . Our review of the record requires us to accept the district court’s conclusion
that plaintiffs have demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the
vicarious copyright infringement claim.”).
127

financial benefit from the infringing materials stored on the network.
Therefore, the service providers may use the safe harbor of section
512(c) because they do not derive a financial benefit from running the
network.

H. Notification
Finally, section 512(c)(1) requires that service providers accept
131
These notifications inform service
notifications from rights holders.
132
providers of infringing activity or material.
If a rights holder does not
present a notification prior to filing a suit for copyright infringement, a
service provider is free to use the safe harbor at trial to disclaim
133
The section states that, “upon notification of claimed
liability.
infringement as described in paragraph (3), [the service provider must
respond] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that
134
is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity.”
The referenced provision, section 512(c)(3), sets forth the notification
135
There are several notification provisions, but for the
requirements.
purposes of the hypothetical network, the important notice requirement is
section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii). Section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) requires that the
notification include: “[i]dentification of the material that is claimed to be
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity and that is to be
removed or access to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably
136
sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the material.”
Essentially, for a notification to be proper, a rights holder must identify
137
infringing material and the location of that material.
¶42

¶43
The rights holder does not need to follow the strictures of the
notification procedure; substantially compliant notification imparts
knowledge to the service provider and creates liability for a service
provider that does not acquiesce to the notification by removing
138
infringing material.
The statute requires identification of a specific

131

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2009).
Id.
133
Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1107 (W.D. Wash.
2004) (“Corbis, of course, was under no obligation to file notice of claimed
infringement before filing this suit.”).
134
§ 512(c)(1)(C).
135
§ 512(c)(3).
136
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
137
Id.
138
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351
F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1107 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (“[Corbis’s] decision to forego the
DMCA notice provisions, however, stripped it of the most powerful evidence of
132

139

location of infringing material or activity, but there are at least two
cases where specific identification is not required. First, when virtually
all of a network resource is infringing—such as a website—a rights
140
In ALS Scan, the court held
holder need only identify that resource.
that the plaintiff had indeed provided sufficient information to locate
infringing material by “assert[ing] that virtually all of the images at the
141
The court held that “when a
two sites were its copyrighted material.”
letter provides notice equivalent to a list of representative works that can
be easily identified by the service provider, the notice substantially
142
complies with the notification requirements.”
¶44
Second, specific identification may not be required when the
143
service provider can easily search for infringing material.
In
Hendrickson, the Central District of California held that a rights holder
did not give eBay sufficient notice where the plaintiff only stated that
144
Since he did not
pirated copies of his movie were being sold on eBay.
identify where the infringing material was located, the court ruled that
145
It noted that, however, like in ALS
the notification was insufficient.
Scan, “there may be instances where a copyright holder need not provide
eBay with specific item numbers to satisfy the identification
146
The court assumed that eBay could search for
requirement.”
147
infringing material given enough information.
The notification must

a service provider’s knowledge—actual notice of infringement from the
copyright holder.”).
139
§ 512(c)(3)(A)(iii).
140
ALS Scan, Inc. v. Remarq Comtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“ALS Scan . . . asserted that virtually all the images at the two sites were its
copyrighted material . . . [and] ALS Scan substantially complied with the
notification requirement.”).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F.Supp. 2d 1082, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“[I]f
a movie studio advised eBay that all listings offering to sell a new movie (e.g.,
``Planet X,'') that has not yet been released in VHS or DVD format are unlawful,
eBay could easily search its website using the title ``Planet X'' and identify the
offensive listings.”).
144
Id. (“[Plaintiff] merely assert that pirated copies of ‘Manson’ DVDs were
being sold on eBay . . . Plaintiff’s e-mail did not identify the basis for his claim
that the seller was selling a pirated copy of ‘Manson.’”).
145
Id. at 1092 (“[P]roper identification under Section 512(c)(3)(A)(iii) should
include the specific item numbers of the listing that are allegedly offering
pirated copies of “Manson” for sale.”).
146
Id. at 1090.
147
Id. at 1090 (“eBay could easily search its website using the title ‘Planet X’
and identify the offensive listings.”).

denote, with some specificity, which files are infringing. If a rights
holder was unable to show that virtually all the data on the network is
infringing (like in ALS Scan) or point to specific acts of infringement
(like in Hendrickson), notification would be insufficient.
¶45
In the hypothetical network, service providers only hold pieces
of encrypted data. Moreover, due to the encoding procedure, only users
with an encoding key can translate the file pieces into the original
encrypted file. Note that if a dictatorial regime could easily scan for
files, the utility of the network would be defeated. Therefore, in the
hypothetical network, infringing files can only be found by trusted users.
Since only trusted users can find files, a rights holder would not have a
way to determine the location of files that infringe its copyright.
Furthermore, the file pieces are not recognizable unless combined to
create a full file. Thus, even if a rights holder did scan for and download
file pieces, upon which there are no restrictions, the rights holder would
be unable to determine if a certain file contained its copyrighted material.
Therefore, the rights holder could not determine which copyrighted work
the file infringed.
¶46
Each service provider only holds one of part of a file; hence, it is
impossible for a service provider to store an infringing file. First, it is
not possible for a rights holder to show what work is being infringed.
When the data is encrypted and broken up, an individual part does not
infringe on any work (at least to the extent that it does not accidentally
transform the scrambled part into another copyrighted work). Second,
although a rights holder is allowed to search the network, the rights
holder would have to be trusted with an encoding key to obtain the
names of the file parts that constitute an original file. In practice, a rights
holder could not determine the location of infringing files. Since the
rights holder cannot determine which copyright a file infringes and the
locations of files that infringe that work, the rights holder could not
present a service provider with proper notification and, without proper
notification, the service provider will never need to “expeditiously”
remove infringing material as required in section (iii) of the knowledge
148
provision.

IV. OTHER BODIES OF LAW
¶47
This iBrief has argued that the service providers of the
hypothetical network can tack gracefully into the safe harbor of section
512(c). Recent cases have indicated that potential service providers of
the hypothetical network should consider the implication of liability
based on bodies of law outside the safe harbor of section 512(c).

148

See supra Part III.E.

Courts have held that certain providers exceeded the bounds of
149
In Aimster, for
section 512 and were not privy to its safe harbor.
example, obvious infringement occurred and the service provider knew
150
Aimster used the -ster ending for its network
of the infringement.
(echoing Napster), and affirmatively taught users how to infringe
copyright on their network.151 In response, the Seventh Circuit spent little
time dismissing the network operator’s ability to moor in the safe harbor
of section 512.152 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that networks
may be liable for less obvious copyright infringement on a theory of
153
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
inducement.
154
Grokster and
the Court created this new theory of copyright liability.
155
StreamCast actively promoted infringement on their networks.
The
Court held that the companies were liable for the infringement of their
users because “[t]he classic instance of inducement is by advertisement
or solicitation that broadcasts a message designed to stimulate others to
156
The decision premised liability on affirmative
commit violations.”
acts: “Grokster and StreamCast are not, however, merely passive
recipients of information about infringing use. . . . Each took active steps
157
Moreover, the Court held that “mere
to encourage infringement.”
knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not
¶48

149

In Re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[In
contrast with the intent of the DMCA,] Aimster invited [users to infringe
copyright], showed them how they could do so with ease using its system, and
by teaching its users how to encrypt their unlawful distribution of copyrighted
material has disabled itself from doing anything to prevent infringement.”).
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. V. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37
(2005) (“[T]he inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it
here, holding that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its
use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by
third parties.”).
154
Id. at 936 (“For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of
patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule,
too, is a sensible one for copyright.”).
155
Id. at 938 (“[B]oth companies communicated a clear message by responding
affirmatively to requests for help in locating and playing copyrighted
materials.”).
156
Id. at 937.
157
Id. at 923–24.

158

be enough here to subject a distributor to liability.”
activity does not give rise to a claim of inducement.

Therefore, passive

In the hypothetical network, the service providers do not
advertise or provide any service to users, except storage. The Grokster
159
decision premised liability on affirmative acts.
Therefore, the
inducement liability created in Grokster is inapplicable to the
hypothetical network’s service providers.
Moreover, the service
providers in the hypothetical network have no idea what data is passing
through their machines. The service providers would not know that
infringing activity was occurring on the network, in contrast with most
file sharing systems. Courts should not impose a new theory of liability
because the hypothetical network respects both the letter and the overall
spirit of section 512.
¶49

CONCLUSION
¶50
What if a service operated completely within the confines of
section 512, yet allowed for unbridled copyright infringement? This
iBrief has outlined such a potential network. Each service provider has a
policy to terminate users and implements that policy, but is unlikely to
160
enforce it.
The service providers do not frustrate standard technical
161
measures.
The service providers provide storage at the direction of
162
users.
The service providers have neither knowledge nor reasonable
163
possibility of knowledge of infringement.
The service providers do
164
not have a right or ability to control the users of the network,
nor
165
receive any financial benefit in connection with the network.
There is
a small likelihood a rights holder could serve a notice on a service
provider that would give them knowledge of infringing activity or
166
A potential chink in this hypothetical is that
material on the network.
a service provider in this potential network is a single user. Although
there is no statutory floor on the size of a service provider, a court may
hold that Congress did not intend to allow the service provider definition
167
Furthermore, a court may hold this
to apply to individuals.

158

Id. at 937.
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 923–24.
160
See supra Part III.B.
161
See supra Part III.C.
162
See supra Part III.D.
163
See supra Part III.E.
164
See supra Part III.F.
165
See supra Part III.G.
166
See supra Part III.H.
167
See supra Part III.A.
159

hypothetical network illegal because of the potential for unbridled
infringement.
¶51
This iBrief has argued that supporters of a hypothetical network
will not be liable under secondary liability theories of copyright
infringement. The network assumes these supporters will retain pieces
of files to ease information transfer among members of a group. The
network was designed to ensure unbridled transfer of information—for
example, information that may otherwise be censored or monitored
through normal communication channels of dictatorial governments.
Therefore, the author hopes this hypothetical network will be used to
encourage activities of oppressed minorities, specifically those seeking
political communication. Paradoxically, even if these supporters hold
files that infringe copyright, the supporters may still benefit from the
broad safe harbor within section 512 of the DMCA.
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